Abstract-Several different models for predicting coverage in a fault-tolerant system are discussed, including models for permanent, intermittent, and transient errors. Markov, semi-Markov, nonhomogeneous Markov, and extended stochastic Petri net models for computing coverage are developed. Two types of events which interfere with recovery are examined; methods for modeling such events (applicable if the events are deterministic or random) are given. The sensitivity of system reliability/availabiIity to the coverage parameter and the sensitivity of the coverage parameter to various error handling strategies are investigated. Particularly, we discovered that a policy of attempting transient recovery upon detection of an error (as opposed to automatically reconfiguring the affected component out of the system) may actually increase the unreliability of the system. This result is true if the error detectability is not nearly perfect, so that the risk of producing an undetectable error (if the transient error is still present) is greater than the benefit gained by not discarding the component.
I. INTRODUCTION
URRENT technology allows sufficient redundancy in C fault-tolerant computer systems to cost-effectively ensure a very low probability of exhaustion of hardware. However, the system designer must be certain that faults and errors are detected promptly, so that the redundant units can be utilized. System models that predict the dependability (reliability, availability, etc.) [ l ] of a system incorporate a parameter called coverage, attributable to Carter [ 2 ] , to reflect the ability of the system to automatically recover from the occurrence of a fault during normal system operation. coverage = Probability [system recovers1 fault occurs].
This error handling naturally depends on the detection of the error, but can range from error correction or masking, to instruction retry, to the complete reconfiguration of the system, and thus coverage can be a very difficult parameter to predict. Furthermore, it has been shown [3] that the reliability of a fault-tolerant system is quite sensitive to the coverage parameter. Thus, it is important to acquire an understanding of Manuscript received October 12, 1986; revised July 12, 1988 . This work was supported in part by NASA Langley Research under Grant NAG-1-70, and by the Air Force Office of Scientific Research under Grant AFOSR-84-0132.
The authors are with the Department of Computer Science, Duke University, Durham, NC 27706. IEEE Log Number 8927536. what constitutes this elusive parameter, to develop detailed models in order to accurately predict the coverage of a system, and to analyze the sensitivity of coverage to its many constituent parameters, such as error type, fault and error detectability, and transient and permanent error handling methods.
A , Importance of Accurately Predicting Coverage
Carter [2] and Arnold [3] , among others, have demonstrated the importance of the coverage parameter. In particular, Carter defined an improvement factor I which is the ratio of mission times during which a specified reliability level is achieved for different values of coverage. Carter gives a specific example with imperfect coverage of 0.9, in which it is possible to increase the mission time by over an order of magnitude ( I = 10.55) if the coverage can be made perfect.
Coverage has a similar effect on the mean time to failure (MTTF) of a system. Consider a system with n processors (components), in which only one processor is necessary for operation; each fails at a constant rate A. The effect of increasing coverage on the system MTTF can be captured by defining a mean time improvement factor (MTIF), which as a function of c, is the ratio of the MTTF with coverage c > 0.9 to system MTTF with c = 0.9.
In Fig. 1 , we see that for systems with a large number of processors, the mean time to failure (MTTF) of the system increases dramatically with increasing coverage. Conversely, we can see that we can drastically overestimate the MTTF of a system with 25 processors (by a factor of nearly 40) if we estimate the coverage incorrectly to be 0.95 when it actually is 0.90.
An even more dramatic impact of coverage can be seen ( Fig. 2) if we add repairs at a constant rate CL for a covered failure and no repair for a noncovered failure. If we now define the mean time improvement factor MTIF due to repairs (that is, the ratio of system MTTF with a given repair rate to the system MTTF with no repairs), we find that MTIF can actually be less than unity for a low enough value of the coverage parameter. In Fig. 2 , we plot the MTIF due to repairs as a function of p/A, for coverage values 0.90, 0.95, and 0.99. In the case where coverage is 0.90, the introduction of repairs at a rate greater than five times the failure rate can '.ri A high repair rate tends to keep the system with a large number of processors functioning, where the leakage rate to system failure state is high. To see the effect of coverage on the availability of a repairable system, we add repairs with rate y for noncovered failures in our system with n components. In Table I , we compare the steady-state availabilities of two systems, as a function of c (with c close to 1 and h = h-'; p = 2 h-'; y = 1 h -l ) . It is clear that the effect of imperfect coverage is predominant and the change in the number of processors has a negligible effect on the system availability.
In the final example, we consider state dependent coverage.
We consider a system with n processors in which there is no single-point failure.
(That is, a single error cannot crash the system.) However, it takes a nonzero amount of time to process and recover from an error. For the sake of simplicity we assume that the system is not repairable, and assume that the delay for processing an error is exponentially distributed with rate parameter 6. In such a case, it can be shown that the state dependent coverage parameter is given by [7] (where i is the number of currently operational processors):
where we have assumed that the occurrence of a second, nearcoincident error [8] while processing the first error results in a coverage failure. If we now compute the reliability of this system as a function of the number of processors n, we find that for appropriately chosen sets of parameter values, system reliability can actually decrease with an increase in the number of processors! If we look at the system unreliability at 10 h of such a system (X = h-l ; 6 = 100 ms), we see that with five processors the unreliability is 0.554 x but with an additional processor the unreliability increases to 0.250 x IO-'. The increase in reliability expected by an additional processor is offset by an increase in the probability of a nearcoincident error.
B. Purpose of this Paper
Having thus concluded that system dependability is extremely sensitive to coverage, we need to properly characterize and quantify this parameter. We consider many proposed coverage models, starting with the simplest phase-type models, and proceeding to complex ones. Although we will be developing quite complex models, we are not advocating that they be used exclusively. For a system that is still in the design phase, the details of the error handling mechanism may not be known. In this case, a modeler would be best served by the simplest of coverage models. As the design progresses, the simple coverage model can be refined. Our methodology allows successive replacement of one coverage model with another within the overall system dependability model. Additionally, we advocate the separate analysis of the more complex coverage models (as we will do in Section VI) in order to determine which system parameters have the most significant effect on the coverage, even if the actual parameter values are not known.
The underlying problem in developing useful coverage models is that when they are included in the overall system model, the resulting model is difficult to solve, generally for two reasons. The resulting model is often very large (Stiffler gives an example of a model for a system that contains over 600 000 states [9] ), and contains time constants that are widely separated and which cause numerical difficulties in the solution. (Recovery times are often expressed in milliseconds, while failure times are often expressed in thousands of hours.) The techniques we present in this paper help to alleviate both of these problems, and provide an interface between lower level coverage models and the overall dependability model, without making the overall model intractable.
After developing and analyzing quite complex coverage models, we present methods for incorporating consideration of limited error handling time in the model solution. In real-time systems, the amount of time available for error handling is severely restricted; in very reliable systems, near-coincident errors may be fatal. We present methods for considering both of these aspects without affecting the tractability of the solution. Where we provide approximations, they lead to conservative measures of system dependability [lo] .
Finally, we present results of experimentation on coverage models, to assess the sensitivity of the coverage parameter to such design parameters as detectability, frequency of self-test, and number of attempts at transient recovery.
C. Some Definitions
In this paper, we borrow some terminology from [l]: A system failure occurs when the delivered service deviates from the specified service. An error is that part of the system state which is liable to lead to failure; the cause of an error is a fault (i.e., a programmer's error, a short circuit, electromagnetic perturbation, etc.). Upon occurrence, a fault creates a latent error, which becomes effective when it is activated; when the error affects the delivered service, a failure occurs. A fault creates one or several latent errors in the component where it occurs. A latent error becomes effective once it is activated. An error may cycle between its latent and effective states. An effective error may propagate from one component to another, creating other (new) errors.
The time constants associated with cycling of the error between the effective and latent states determine if the error is considered permanent, intermittent, or transient. If an error, once activated, remains effective for a long time (relative to the time needed to detect and handle it), it may be considered permanent. If the error cycles relatively quickly between the active and latent states, it may be considered intermittent. If the error, once activated, becomes latent, and remains latent for a long time, it may be considered a transient. Also, if an error is caused by temporary external interference, such that the error is correctable once the interference ceases, it is considered a transient.
As an example, suppose a latent error exists in some portion of hardware. If the software (and corresponding inputs) continually exercises the faulty hardware, the latent error is likely to become effective immediately, and remain active. It would then appear to be permanent. Suppose, however, that two software modules quickly alternate execution, and that only one exercises the faulty hardware. The latent error will then cycle relatively quickly between the effective and latent (often called active and benign [l 11) states. The same error will appear to be transient, however, if the faulted portion of hardware is infrequently exercised.
If a latent error is activated and subsequently detected, the system usually cannot tell immediately which type of error exists. System designers often make some assumptions concerning the nature of the expected errors and faults, and the fault tolerance of the system is designed with these assumptions in mind. The designer then can create a model of the error handling behavior of the system that can be used to evaluate the coverage of the system under various hypothetical circumstances.
ERROR HANDLING W I T H O~J T TIME LIMITATIONS
In this section, we consider models that allow us to compute coverage probabilities where we can ignore any interference that may occur with the error handling process. We proceed from a simple discrete-time Markov model to continuous-time Markov models to nonhomogeneous Markov and semiMarkov models. All error handling models will be single entry multiple exit models. The object of the analysis of each model is to determine the probability of reaching one of the (mutually exclusive) exit states (given that the model was entered at the distinguished initial state). This will allow us to replace the entire error handling model by a branch point in the overall dependability model. An implicit assumption that we make is that the time spent by the system during error handling is negligible compared to time spent in states without any effective errors.
First consider a discrete time Markov chain (DTMC) with the transition probability matrix P = [ p , ] where pi, is the probability that the next state will be an error handling state j given that the current state is the error handling state i. Let r,, be the probability of reaching an exit state j from an error handling state i and let the matrix R = [r,,] . Then the matrix of eventual exit probabilities given an entry state is given by A high-level abstraction of a typical error handling model may divide the process into sequential phases, forming a DTMC. For example, Gay describes a partition of the maintenance software of an electronic switching system into modules for recovery, diagnosis, and trouble location [ 131. Anderson and Lee [ 141 describe four phases of fault tolerance: error detection, damage confinement and assessment, error recovery, and fault treatment for continued service. If we concentrate first on a model for permanent effective errors (those which, once activated, remain effective), a three-phase error handling model of detection, location, and recovery might appear as in Fig. 4 . With each of the three error handling phases is associated a duration and a probability of success. The overall probability of successful system recovery is given by the product of success probabilities of individual phases. Thus, in our example Fig. 4 , system coverage is given
The model proposed by the designers of CAST [15] combined the notion of transient restoration with a permanent Failure to detect the error is conservatively assumed to pollute the system with more errors resulting in a system failure. After detection, transient recovery is attempted; it is successful (if the error is transient) with probability 1 -1. (Here 1 is the transient leakage.) Unsuccessful transient recovery leads to permanent recovery where the cause of the error (the fault) is located (with probability U ) and the system recovers (with probability w). The parameters U , U , I, and w are all subscripted to denote their possible dependence on the number of active components, n.
Next consider a continuous time Markov chain (CTMC) model [16] , where the labels on the arcs represent the rate at which the state changes occur, rather than simply probabilities as in the previous models. Specifically, we consider the CARE I11 single-error model, shown in Fig. 6 . In the CARE model, state A is entered on activation of the error; in this A state, the effective error begins to pollute the system with more errors (at rate p to state P). The effective error may be detected (state D ) by self-checking circuitry (at rate 6) before affecting delivered service. The error may become latent (state B ) before producing more errors or being detected. Global error detection mechanisms may detect an error (at rate E with probability q ) before delivered service is affected.
This coverage model can be used to represent either permanent (always effective) or intermittent errors. An intermittent error is usually represented as a two-state, continuousparameter Markov chain, where the states represent the effective and latent states of the error [ 1 11. Intermittent errors are those that cycle very quickly between the two states, and so we can include this behavior in the coverage model itself. (If the cycle time were very long, the error would appear to be transient, and its behavior could not be included solely within the coverage model.) Permanent errors are represented in this model by setting (Y and 6 (the rate at which an effective error goes latent and vice versa) to zero. where q,, is the rate of transition to an error handling state j given that the current state is the error handling state i. Let rIl be the rate of transition to an exit statej from an error handling state i and let the matrix R = [r,,] . Then the matrix of eventual exit probabilities given an entry state is given by [ -Q ] -'R [17] . In the CARE model, the exit probability from the A state to the D state is given by 6
4P
4 P + 6 6 + p 6 + p p + 6
c=-+-=-Each of the previous models, when included in the overall reliability model, can easily be replaced with a branch point. As an example of such a branch point replacement, consider a simple three-unit redundant system that requires one unit for the system to remain operational. Effective errors are activated independently in each unit at rate A; the coverage model is the CARE I11 model discussed earlier. The reliability model for this system is shown in Fig. 7 , where the coverage model is enclosed in the rectangular boxes. The coverage model is solved in isolation for the parameter c, and is replaced by a branch point; the overall model is then solved to predict the reliability of the system.
The first Markov chain of Fig. 7 is stiff in the sense that it contains both fast transition rates (in the coverage model) and slow transition rates (in the overall model). Because of this time separation, we have used behavioral decomposition to facilitate solution [ 7 ] .
For a homogeneous Markov chain, the transition rates are independent both of the global time, and of the amount of time spent in the state thus far. It is possible to use more complex stochastic processes to model the error handling behavior. In a semi-Markov process, the transition rates from a state depend on the current state and the next state, and on the time already spent in the state (local time). For example, the CARE 111 single-effective-error model is a semi-Markov model. To Phase i is entered with probability PE,-the recovery procedure associated with phase i is effective with probability E,. The expressions for the three coverage probabilities can be determined as previously [ 2 11.
x Pr[transient gone before phase i begins]
111. TRANSIENT LIFETIME CONSIDERED and Consider the coverage model proposed by Avizienis et al.
for transient errors (the ARIES model) [20] . The model has three possible eventual exits: system crash, normal processing, and permanent fault recovery. In this model, shown in Fig. 8, 1 -CR is the probability that an error causes an immediate system failure, PE, is the probability that the system enters the ith recovery phase, and PR, is the probability that the system recovers in the ith recovery phase (after being unable to recover in any of the previous phases). We can easily obtain the transient restoration probability (the probability that the normal processing state is reached) (call it r), and the probability of successful permanent error recovery (call it c). The probability of a coverage failure is then given by 1 -rc.
In the above analysis, we tacitly assumed that the system is able to recover successfully during a given transient recovery phase with a fixed probability. However, a transient error with a long lifetime may not permit such a recovery. Transient recovery is successful in phase i if the system is able to recover from the transient error with the procedure represented by that phase, and if the transient effective error has become latent by the time the procedure begins. In the ARIES model, it is assumed that the transient error lifetime is a random variable More generally, if the transient error lifetime is a nonexponential random variable, with the distribution function FD(t), then the above expression for PR; generalizes to P R , = P E , -, X E ; X F~( T I + T~+ . . . +
K-1).
A similar generalization to the case where the recovery phase durations are not constants can also be made.
A transient error model was also proposed by Stiffler [22] , in which the lifetime of the transient is assumed to be exponentially distributed with parameter CY. Otherwise, the model is semi-Markovian and has cycles in it. It is more limited than the ARIES model in that the duration of each transient recovery phase is restricted to being independent and having an identical distribution. Stiffler's model, however, allows a random number of transient recovery phases (in ARIES the number of phases is fixed), and allows general distributions for the recovery phases.
Stiffler further generalized his coverage model and proposed a model that can be specialized to the transient, intermittent, or permanent case (see Fig. 7 is still 3h, while in Fig. 9 it is only 3h(1 -r).
IV. ESPN MODELS
Combining both local and global timing in the same model is most easily done with an ESPN (extended stochastic petri net) model. An ESPN model has two types of nodes: places (drawn as circles) and transitions (drawn as bars). They are connected by directed arcs (see Fig. 10 for an example). Places generally represent particular conditions, while transitions represent events that may occur when a given set of conditions is true, and which change the set of true conditions. The state of the system is represented by distributing a number of tokens (drawn as small filled circles) over the places in the net to represent the set of true conditions. A transition is said to be enabled if each of its input places contains at least one token. An enabled transition fires by removing a token from each input place and depositing a token in each output place. The number of input places need not equal the number of output places; the total number of tokens in the net need not be constant. Since a transition represents the occurrence of an event, we can associate time with the firing of a transition. Immediate transitions (drawn as thin bars) fire in zero time, while a distribution of firing time is associated with timed transitions (drawn as thick bars). Fig. 10 shows a coverage model of a system that combines hardware and software error detection techniques (selfchecking circuitry and periodic diagnostics). Errors that are not detected by hardware checking circuits may be detected by a diagnostic program that is run periodically. The unit diagnostic is periodically executed even if there is no indication of an error in the unit, so as to detect latent errors in the system [23] .
When a latent error is activated, a token is deposited in the place labeled effective error, enabling transition T1. Transition T1 fires immediately, and deposits a token in the place labeled perm, with probability p , or in place inter A (active intermittent) with probability i, or place trans with probability t. If the effective error is permanent, its representative token remains in the corresponding place, much as a permanent error remains in the system. If the error is intermittent, the token will circulate between the inter A and inter B places. If the error is transient, its representative token will eventually move to the trans gone place. While the error is not benign, transitions T2 or T3 may be enabled. (An arc with a small circle signifies an inhibitor arc. The transition is enabled if there is no token in the input place.) There is also a set of two places and transitions that represent the state of the running process: norm (normal operation), or diag (diagnostics). Initially, a token is present in the norm place, and cycles around through these two places. When the token is in the norm place, the effective error propagates in the system. The error may be detected by local (hardware) error detection mechanisms with probability s (transition T2); if not detected, the system is polluted. These additional errors (or indeed the original effective error) may be detected by some global error detection mechanisms (transition T4) with probability q. When the system is undergoing diagnostics, transition T3 is enabled and the error may be detected with probability c. Each of the probabilities c, q, and s are conditional, and are conditioned on the event that an error exists. Once an error is detected, the recovery process may begin.
The counter place counts the number of times an error is detected. The first k times it is detected, the system attempts some recovery (assuming that the error is transient), denoted by the place labeled start T.R., after which the system undergoes diagnostics. If the transient error disappears in the meantime, the transient restoration (trans rest) exit is taken. If an error is detected more than k times, permanent recovery (including locating the source of the error and reconfiguring the system) is commenced. The solution method used for an ESPN model depends upon the distributions chosen for the transition firing times. If all the firing times are assumed to be exponentially distributed (or take zero time), then the ESPN can be converted to a Markov chain for solution [24], [25] . (This is the method that will be used for the parametric sensitivity analysis in Section VI.) If the transition times are all deterministic, then we have a GTPN (generalized timed petri net), solved as a discrete time Markov chain [26]. Under certain conditions, the net may be solved as a semi-Markov process [27] or it may be simulated for solution.
V. LIMITED RECOVERY TIME
So far we have assumed that the recovery process is allowed to proceed without any interference, no matter how long the recovery takes to complete. In practice, however, there are several types of interference that can and do occur during system recovery. We will consider two types of interference in this section. First, in real-time systems, there may be a time limit within which recovery actions must be completed in order to be considered successful.
Second, in highly reliable systems, we must consider the effects of a second, near-coincident [8] error that may occur during the attempted recovery from a single error. Given a particular error, assume that the set of all possible errors has been partitioned into two classes. The errors in the first class, called the dependent class, are those whose occurrence can interfere with recovery from the given error. The second class contains the independent errors, those whose occurrence does not affect recovery from the given error. Thus, we are only interested in predicting the occurrence of dependent near-coincident errors during attempted recovery from a single error. We will be slightly conservative in the assumption that the occurrence of such a near-coincident error will cause system failure. (Some authors allow two errors to coexist without necessarily causing system failure [28], [22] .)
To motivate this discussion, we will first consider a simple example. Assume that the time to perform recovery is exponentially distributed with parameter 6 , and that the recovery is always successful. In the case where there is no limit on the recovery time, the coverage probability is unity. If there is a time limit T on the recovery process, then the coverage probability cT is given by cT= Prob[recovery t i m e s TI = 1 -e-6T.
To facilitate a more general discussion of the modeling of interference, we postulate a meta-coverage model, that is, a model of a coverage model. This meta-model has a singleentry point and (up to) three exits. Error handling begins (the submodel is entered) when an error occurs in the system. Let us label the entry point of the coverage model I. There are three mutually exclusive exits from the submodel, labeled R , C, and S , representing transient restoration, permanent coverage, and single-point failure, respectively. Error handling completes (the submodel is excited) when recovery is successful (exits R and C) or when the system fails (exit S ) .
We will add a fourth exit from the model (labeled N ) to represent the occurrence of an interfering event during recovery. To do this, we solve the coverage model in isolation for the probability of reaching each of the three exits, and for the time needed to reach each exit. Given the time to the occurrence of an interfering event, and the time needed to reach the exit, we can determine the probability of reaching the exit before an interfering event occurs. Thus, coverage now involves two phenomena: first the system must be able to recover from the error, and second, this recovery must occur before another event can interfere.
Let PIc(T) denote the probability of the system recovery leading to a degraded state (i.e., reaching the C exit from the coverage model) in an amount of time I T from the time of occurrence of the error. I Likewise, PIR(T) represents the probability of successful transient restoration in time s r , and P,s(r) represents the probability of a single-point failure in time I T . These distributions represent the solution of the coverage model in isolation, that is, without consideration of its relation to the overall reliability model. Let i , 2, and s" denote the probability of eventually reaching the appropriate exit.
s^= lim PIs(7).
Then, using the traditional notion of coverage (that is, ignoring the possibility of interfering events), we could set the desired coverage factors to these limiting probabilities [29] , [16] :
I The distribution Plc may be defective, in the sense that lim,+m Plc(t) < 1.
P,R and Pfs are also defective distributions, and lirn,+-{ P f c ( f ) + P f R ( f )
More realistically, it is not sufficient to know that the system would eventually recover. Recovery is successful only if it is completed before the occurrence of a interfering event.
Thus, setting the coverage factors to the limiting value of the exit distributions is optimistic, especially if recovery time is long in comparison to error activations or deadlines. These limiting values must then be "adjusted" to account for the time needed to recover from an error.
Let YR, Y,, and Ys be random variables representing the time to reach the corresponding exit of the coverage model (conditioned on actually reaching the exit), where F~, ( T ) , F (T), and FYs (7) Similarly, rT = i F y R ( T ) and sT = s"Fys(T). The probability of system failure due to a long recovery duration is given by nT = 1 -rT -cT -sT. Now, if the recovery time distributions are available in closed form (or as empirical distributions), then the application of the above formula is straightforward. If the Laplace transform is available, numerical inversion techniques may be used. However, in many cases only the first few moments of the recovery time distributions may be available. From the available moments we can bound the probability of an interfering event. Using the Markov inequality [16], we see
Using the Chebyshev inequality [ 161, we see
Combining the two inequalities, we can use as the value for the coverage factor cT. A similar analysis is done for the transient restoration and single-point failure exits from the model.
Next we consider the interference of a near-coincident error. For the simple example, we assume that the time to recover is exponentially distributed with parameter 6. Let us again consider the reliability model of the three-unit system. Since we allow near-coincident errors to occur while the system is handling a given error, there are transitions from each state in the coverage model to the failure state in Fig. 11 . Since the time to handle an error is much less than the time to the occurrence of a near-coincident error (6 6 A) we can replace the error handling states with a branch point and obtain the reduced model. Notice the similarity between Figs. 7 and 11 but the coverage factors that result in the latter figure are now state dependent.
In the more general case, we have the distribution of time to For many coverage models, like the CARE 111 single-error model (Fig. 6) , the derivation of the Laplace transform of the time-to-exit distribution is not difficult, especially since we are not interested in inverting to the time domain. However, for coverage models that are simulated (i.e., ESPN's) for solution, the Laplace transform of the time to exit is not an easily estimated parameter, and must be approximated from the simulation data. Fortunately, this approximation produces good results [7] .
If we perform a Taylor series expansion of the LaplaceStieltjes transform, we have [7] 1 .
[
3!
With similar expressions for r, and s,. Since (yn/n!)EIY;l are likely to approach zero very rapidly, only the first few moments of the recovery time distribution are needed [7] , [81.
Note that the use of an odd number of moments for r, and c, and an even number of moments for s , leads to conservative reliability estimates. In the case where the failure process has Weibull distribution, the Taylor series expansion may be generalized [5] . Thus, the information needed from the fault/ error handling model is, for each exit, the exit probability, and time-to-exit distribution or the first few moments of the distribution. The calculation of the state-dependent nearcoincident error factor from these three factors is then n,= 1 -(c,+r,+s,) .
VI. PARAMETRIC SENSITIVITY OF COVERAGE MODELS
Now that we have developed quite complex coverage models, we wish to perform studies to analyze the effects of their constituent parameters on the coverage of the system. For this experimentation, we use a slightly modified version of the model in Fig. 10 , in which we assume that fault location and subsequent automatic system reconfiguration are perfect and instantaneous. We begin by analyzing separate permanent, intermittent, and transient error models, by separately setting the values of p , i, and t to one. To facilitate the solution of the model, we assume that the times associated with each of the transitions are exponentially distributed. The mean time spent in normal processing is l/v, and the mean of the execution time of the diagnostic program is 1/77, An effective error is detected by self-checking circuitry at rate p with probability s (during normal processing). If not detected directly (and quickly enough) by the checking circuits, the error propagates through the system at rate E , polluting the system with more errors (that may be detected by the checking circuitry). An error not detected by local detection mechanisms may be detected by global error checking devices (with probability q ) ; if not detected globally, the not detected state is entered. During diagnostics, an effective error is detected with probability c at rate 6.
For the permanent and intermittent models, transient recovery is not meaningful, so the model is exited when the error is detected. In the transient model, however, the first several times that an error is detected, transient recovery is attempted. After k tries at transient recovery (if an error is detected again), the permanent coverage path is taken. For all three models, since we are assuming exponentially distributed firing times, the models are solved by converting the ESPN to an equivalent Markov chain for solution.
A . Analysis of the Permanent Model
The ESPN model used for this example is the same as shown in Fig. 10 , with the probability that the effective error is permanent set to one ( p = 1). The solution of this net consists of the solution of the Markov chain that arises from the enumeration of all possible markings [25] , [19] . In this study, we investigated the relative merit of increasing the detection probabilities (s, c, and q), given three cases concerning the frequency at which diagnostics are run. The first case considered a system that ran no diagnostics; the second considered a system in which 1 percent of the time was spent running diagnostics; the third considered the case where 10 percent of the time was spent in diagnostics. In [23], Gay derived an expression for the steady-state optimum diagnostic scheduling frequency for a system with a single operational unit, and an approximate expression for the optimum routine exercise frequency for duplex units (optimum with respect to minimizing downtime). This analysis is similar, except that we explicitly consider the detection probabilities associated with the checking circuits, the diagnostics programs, and the global error checking capabilities. Also, we are assuming a much finer time scale granularity for the normal processingidiagnostics cycle. We assume that the time scale for the cycle is on the same order as the time for errors to be detected or propagate, and thus the switching should be represented within the coverage model. Gay assumes a frequency of diagnostics on the order of 50-100 times per year; in his model, this switching is more properly included in the overall model, rather than in the coverage model.
The results of the sensitivity analysis are shown in Fig. 12 . In this figure we show, for several sets of parameters, the percent increase of the detection probability that results from a 1 percent increase in the constituent parameters. For example, the arrows in the upper-left show that, when there are no diagnostics, and the error detectability is low, the system will experience a 0.54 percent increase in detection probability when s is increased by I percent. Overall, we see a greater increase in detection probability from an increase in s (the probability of local error detection) than from an increase in q (the probability of global error detection), although the effect decreases as the probability of detection increases. We also see a monotonic increase in detection probability as the frequency of diagnostics increases (as expected). (The baseline parameters for this study were: diagnostic detection rate, 6 = 5 ; self-checking detection rate, p = 0.5; error propagation rate, E = 1 ; and diagnostic program execution rate, 17 = 1, all in units of seconds-I ) .
B. Analysis of Intermittent Model
For the analysis of the intermittent model, we again used the ESPN of Fig. 10 , with the probability that an error is intermittent set to one (i = 1). Assuming that an error exists in the system, this error cycles between the effective and latent (active and benign) states while the system cycles between normal processing and diagnostics.
In this study, we are interested in assessing the effect that cy (the rate at which an effective error goes latent) and / 3 (the rate at which a latent error becomes effective) has on the probability of error detection. We are assuming that the rates cy and / 3 are comparable (in magnitude) to the other rates in the coverage model. Fig. 13 shows the results of this study, where for three different relationships between cy (the rate at which effective errors go benign) and / 3 (the rate at which benign errors become active), we varied the detection duty cycle as in the permanent model while holding the individual detection probabilities constant (c = q = s = 0.5). In the first case, cy and /3 are equal, so that an error is effective half the time. In the second case, cy is one hundred times faster than /3, so that an error is latent 99 percent of the time, while in the last case, an error is effective 99 percent of the time. In all three cases, it was most advantageous to improve s, the detection probability of checking circuitry, although improving q (the global error detection probability) is nearly as effective. Comparing the results of the intermittent model to that of the permanent model (the center column of Fig. 12 ), in the case where the error is nearly always effective (the last row of Fig. 13 ) the probability of detection is almost equal. The decrease in the detection probability as the error spends more time latent is more dramatic as the frequency of diagnostics decreases.
C. Analysis of Transient Model
The goal of this example is to investigate the effects of various parameters on the coverage factors particularly with respect to transient errors. The ESPN model used for this example is shown in Fig. 10 where the probability of an error being transient ( t ) is set to one. We set the nominal parameters to the same values as in the previous example (6 = 5 ; p = 0.5; E = 1; c = s = q = 0.5), assumed 10 percent diagnostics (v %increase in detection probability % increase detection probability , .' a = p attempts at transient recovery improves the probability that a component is not discarded, it also increases the time needed to perform recovery from an error. In the scenario of limited recovery time, this may be unacceptable, as we will see in the next section. increased each of the system parameters (c, s, q, v, and ,U) by 1 percent and observed the resulting change in the exit probabilities (there are now three possible exits to the coverage model, where in the previous two cases there were only two). We then performed the same set of experiments for k (the number of attempts at transient recovery) from 1 to 5 . From Fig. 14 we can see that increasing error detectability during normal processing (s is local error detection and q is global error detection) increases the probability of successful recovery, and dramatically decreases the probability of coverage failure, for all values of k shown. In contrast, increasing the effectiveness of self-checking circuitry during diagnostics (c) decreases the transient restoration probability while increasing the permanent coverage probability.
Increasing the transient recovery rate ( p ) actually decreases the transient restoration probability (although the effect decreases with higher k), while increasing the single-point failure probability. As we increase the number of attempts at transient recovery, the transient restoration probability increases (as expected), but the probability of single-point failure increases also. Although increasing the number of VII. ANALYSIS OF A SYSTEM MODEL To assess the effect of transient recovery on system reliability (for this model of transient recovery), we embedded the transient model of the previous section within the threeunit model studied previously (Fig. 9) . We want to determine, for the nominal parameter values used in the previous experiments, the optimal value for k (the number of attempts at transient recovery), subject to a limit on the acceptable recovery time. The results of this experiment were initially surprising: for the set of parameters chosen, the optimal value for the number of attempts at transient recovery is zero! This behavior is substantiated by the results shown in the previous section; regardless of the parameter values chosen, the singlepoint failure probability monotonically increases with k. Each pass through the detect-recovery cycle creates the possibility of an undetected error propagating through the system.
Further experimentation revealed that an error detectability c = s = q = 0.99999 is needed before transient recovery is useful in the example redundant system. (In a nonredundant system, attempting transient recovery is always preferable to discarding an essential unit.) When 0.99999 was used for all three error detection probabilities, the reliability of the three unit was optimal f o r k = 0 (no attempt at transient recovery) if recovery time was limited to about 15 s. If a longer recovery time was permitted, up to about 45 s, then a single attempt at transient recovery k = 1 was better than no try. If there was no limit on recovery time, then more attempts at transient recovery improved the reliability of the system. (We were unable to determine the optimal value of k for the simple system, because the probabilities were becoming too small to be significant.)
We note that Lee, in his thesis [30] , came to a similar conclusion when investigating the usefulness of instruction retry. He was interested in minimizing task completion time, and compared instruction retry to process migration. He considered the time needed to retry an instruction, and the probability that the retry was successful versus migrating the active process to another processor upon error detection.
VIII. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
The analysis of the dependability of a fault-tolerant system is strongly influenced by the accurate prediction of the coverage (the probability that the system can recover from an error). Toward the goal of accurate coverage prediction, we surveyed a variety of coverage models, from simple phasetype models to complex extended stochastic Petri nets. The simple phase-type models are useful for an initial analysis of a proposed design, since many details of the recovery procedure are not known. Such phase-type models can be solved very quickly for the coverage parameters; in most cases, one can simply write down the desired probabilities by inspection.
Nonexponential behavior within the error handling model . Any of these model types can be used for the coverage model while still retaining a homogeneous Markov chain for the overall model (constant failure and repair rates). After considering methods for incorporating the lifetime of a transient error into the coverage model, we develop a quite general ESPN coverage model. In practice, the recovery mechanism is not permitted to continue until completion; we look at two types of events that may interfere with successful recovery. In real-time systems, there may be a hard deadline for recovery actions to be completed. In highly reliable systems, the effects of a second, near-coincident error must be considered. We present methods for modeling such events when predicting the coverage of the system if the recovery time distribution is available, or its Laplace transform, or if only the first few moments are known. These methods are applicable for deterministic or random interfering events.
Many of the techniques presented in this paper have been implemented in HARP (the hybrid automated reliability predictor), [7] , [5] developed at Duke University under the sponsorship of NASA Langley Research Center.
Parametric sensitivity of the coverage factors to the system parameters was performed experimentally. The probability of successful detection of an error was shown to be most sensitive to local error detectability-the closer to the point of activation that an error is detected, the better. Furthermore, for transient errors in a redundant system, an extremely high detectability > 0.99999 is needed to justify transient recovery. In ultrareliable systems, in which detection is often assumed to be near perfect, transient restoration can dramatically improve system reliability, and should certainly be used. However, if the detectability is not nearly perfect, it may be better to assume that all errors are permanent, and reconfigure at every detected error. In either case, it is essential to construct detailed models of the coverage process and to assess the impact of parameters on the reliability of the system. Kishor S. Trivedi 
